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Globalization and Strategic Research Investments
* 
 
We develop a general equilibrium model of international trade with heterogeneous firms, 
where countries can invest into basic research to improve their technological potential. These 
research investments tighten firm selection and raise the average productivity of firms in the 
market, thereby implying lower consumer prices and higher welfare. In an open economy, 
there is also a strategic investment motive since a higher technological potential gives 
domestic firms a competitive advantage in trade. Countries tend to over-invest due to this 
strategic motive. There are thus welfare gains from coordinating research investments. The 
over-investment problem turns to an under-investment problem if there are sufficiently strong 
cross-country spillovers of basic research investments. 
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assistance. 1 Introduction
Investments into research and development are an important spending item. Table 1
reports the gross domestic expenditure on research and development ( GERD) as a share
of gross domestic product (GDP) in 21 OECD countries. These R&D spending shares
di￿er vastly even within the OECD: some countries spend just about 1 per cent, while
countries like Sweden, Finland or Korea devote much larger shares of their national income
to R&D expenditures. A substantial share of these expenditures is ￿nanced publically
with taxpayers’ money. This includes purely public research projects and higher education
spending, as well as subsidies to private R&D, innovation funds, and so on. Typically, the
public share of the total GERD exceeds one third and moves up to more than two thirds
in some countries, which adds up to considerable per-capita amounts that governments
spend annually for R&D purposes. As Table 1 shows, this public research expenditure has
increased in almost all OECD countries during the recent time period from 2000 to 2007/08,
the Netherlands and Japan being two exceptions. That is, public spending on research and
development has apparently become more important over time, and now looms higher on
policy agendas than it was the case about 10 years ago.
Table 1 here
It is well understood that R&D investments are a key ingredient of sustained economic
growth, as they raise the amount of innovation in an economy (Grossman and Helpman
1991). It is also well understood why governments are heavily involved in the ￿nancing
of basic research, since the public good characteristics of knowledge and ideas tend to
jeopardize private investment incentives (Nelson 1950). What is less well understood in
the literature, however, is how international trade a￿ects the incentives of a government to
strategically invest into the country’s technological potential by supporting basic research
or conducting public R&D. There seems to be a widespread perception among policymakers
that such public R&D investments become increasingly important in a world with falling
trade barriers, since developed countries perceive the need to support domestic ￿rms in
maintaining competitiveness on global markets. 1 Yet, to the best of our knowledge, there
is no theoretical literature which has formally studied these issues.
1See, for example, the Conclusions of the Council of the European Union (2008): ￿Providing high-quality
education and investing more and more e￿ciently in human capital and creativity throughout people’s
lives are crucial conditions for Europe’s success in a globalized world￿ (p.9). Also see Zhou and Leydesdor￿
(2006) for a discussion that particularly emphasizes the role of China’s rise in the world economy in that
regard.
1In this paper, we develop a two-country general equilibrium model of trade with het-
erogeneous ￿rms ￿ la Melitz (2003). 2 In our framework, entrepreneurs can enter a mo-
nopolistically competitive manufacturing industry subject to a sunk cost. Upon entry,
they randomly draw their productivity level from a known distribution. As in Demidova
(2008), we consider this distribution to be country-speci￿c, but in contrast to that paper
we allow for endogenous technology di￿erences across countries. In particular, the govern-
ment of either country can invest into basic research. These research investments raise the
country’s technological potential, which is modelled as a right-shift of the support of the
distribution from which the domestic entrants draw their productivity level. By raising the
technological potential of a country, these public investments initially lead to an increase
in the expected value of entry. Entrepreneurs still face uncertainty about their individual
productivity, and may end up with a draw that is too low to be able to remain in the
market. The public research investments therefore do not o￿set idiosyncratic risks of busi-
ness failure, which is consistent with the evidence that even the most highly developed and
advanced economies (like the US, Germany or Japan) are characterized by substantial exit
and churning rates among ￿rms (Geroski 1995). If these investments do not bene￿t every
￿rm ex post, they do raise the ex ante premises for entrepreneurs, however. Understand-
ing the underlying mechanisms of this policy thus necessarily requires a model with ￿rm
heterogeneity and ex ante uncertainty among entrants. 3
The motive for public research investments in our model is that the increase in the
country’s technological potential eventually leads to tighter ￿rm selection and higher av-
erage productivity of ￿rms, which in turn lowers prices and raises welfare in equilibrium.
In the open economy, there is an additional strategic motive. If one country invests more
than the other, this yields tougher selection in the leading and softer selection in the lag-
gard country. Exporting becomes easier for ￿rms from the leading country, as the export
market is now easier to capture. Firms from the laggard country face tougher competition
in their home market, and exporting becomes more di￿cult. Public research investments
2It is a well-established empirical fact that there is substantial ￿rm heterogeneity even in narrowly
de￿ned industries in such dimensions as productivity, size, or export activity. See, e.g., the empirical
studies by Bernard and Jensen (1999), Aw et al. (2000), or Clerides et al. (1998). This empirical observation
has triggered a large theoretical literature on trade with heterogeneous ￿rms, e.g. Melitz (2003), Bernard
et al. (2003), Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), Demidova (2008). Strategic investments into a country’s
technological potential have not yet been considered in that literature, however.
3In a model with homogeneous ￿rms and without ex ante uncertainty, such as Krugman (1980), a
technological improvement would be tantamount to a decrease in marginal costs of all ￿rms. Our model
highlights di￿erent features, as it is crucially based on the extensive margin of ￿rms’ entry, survival, and
exporting activities.
2thus give domestic ￿rms ￿ on average ￿ a competitive advantage, and countries tend to
invest more the higher the level of trade openness is. This result is consistent with the
empirical observation that almost all OECD countries have raised R&D spending during
a period that was characterized by falling trade barriers. From a normative perspective,
the investments induce a negative cross-country externality so that single countries over-
invest. There are thus welfare gains from supranational coordination of public research
investments. We also allow for direct R&D spillovers across countries, following a huge
literature that has studied R&D spillovers across ￿rms. 4 That is, the public research in-
vestment in one country may, to some extent, also raise the technological potential of the
other country, because the generated knowledge becomes at least partly accessible across
the border. With cross-country spillovers the socially optimal investment level is higher
the freer trade is, and the over-investment problem is reduced and may even turn to an
under-investment problem if the spillover is strong enough.
This paper is related to the large literature on public investments into research and
development, e.g., Gonzales and Pazo (2008), Kleer (2008). We add to this literature
by analyzing the positive and normative consequences of those investments in an open
economies context, and by studying how trade liberalization a￿ects the strategic invest-
ment incentives in general equilibrium. Our paper is also related to the small but growing
literature on policy issues in models of international trade with heterogeneous ￿rms, e.g.
Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (2009), Chor (2009), or P￿ueger and Suedekum (2009).
However, no paper has so far considered government investments into basic research and
endogenous cross-country di￿erences in technological potentials. Finally, our paper is re-
lated to the literature on international tax competition. The typical setup of those models
is that jurisdictions compete for mobile factors or ￿rms, and there is an extensive discus-
sion whether tax competition then leads to under- or over-provision of public goods (e.g.,
Zoodrow and Mieszkowski 1986, BØnassy-QuØrØ et al. 2005). Our framework di￿ers in
two important respects. First, there is no cross-country mobility but all policy e￿ects are
transmitted via (costly) trade. Second and more importantly, though one may think of the
research investments as the provision of a public good that makes ￿rms (on average) more
productive, our analysis relies crucially on ￿rm heterogeneity and ex ante uncertainty ￿
features that have been rarely studied in the tax competition literature so far. 5
4See, e.g., Cohen and Levinthal (1989), Ja￿e (1989), Adams (1990), Ja￿e et al. (1998), O’Mahony and
Vecci (2009).
5The recent papers by Davies and Eckel (2009) and Krautheim and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2010) are
exceptions, but they do not consider public research investments and their trade-mediated e￿ects.
3The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we consider a closed economy
version of our model, and in section 3 we introduce the open economy setting. Section 4
derives the Nash-equilibrium and the cooperative policy for the case without direct cross-
country spillovers, while section 5 considers the case with spillovers. Section 6 concludes.
2 Closed Economy
We ￿rst consider a closed economy which is populated by L workers who inelastically supply
one unit of labor each. Labor is the only factor of production and perfectly mobile across
two industries: a homogeneous goods sector A with constant returns to scale and perfect
competition, and a manufacturing industry C which is monopolistically competitive and
consists of a continuum of di￿erentiated varieties. Each variety is produced by a single ￿rm
under increasing returns to scale, and the ￿rms are heterogeneous in their productivities.
2.1 Preferences
The preferences of a household h are de￿ned over the homogeneous good, which is used as
the numeraire, and the set of di￿erentiated varieties 
. Utility is represented by a quasi-
linear, logarithmic function with constant elasticity of substitution (CES) subutility over
the set of varieties:












where 0 <  < 1 and  > 0. The household’s consumption of a variety z is given by qh (z).
The elasticity of substitution between any two varieties is given by   1=(1   ). The CES







. Utility maximization implies per-capita expenditures
PCh =  and Ah = yh    for the manufacturing aggregate and the homogeneous good,
respectively. We assume that  < yh, i.e., that the preference for varieties is not too large.
Indirect utility is then given by:
V
h = y
h    lnP +  (ln   1): (1)
We drop the index h from now on as all households are identical. Total demand and
revenue for a single variety z can then be computed as q (z) = Lp(z)
  P  1 and
r(z) = p(z)q (z) = L(P=p(z))
 1, respectively.
42.2 Production and Firm Behavior
In sector A one unit of labor is transformed into one unit of output. Since the price for
that good is normalized to one, and since workers are mobile across sectors, this implies
that the wage in the closed economy is also equal to one. In the manufacturing industry,
a ￿rm needs l = f + q=' units of labor to produce q units of output. The overhead cost
f is the same, but the marginal costs 1=' are heterogeneous across ￿rms. A higher value
of ' represents a higher ￿rm-level productivity. Firms have zero mass and thus take the
price index P as given. Since consumers have iso-elastic demands, it is straightforward
to see that ￿rms charge prices which are constant mark-ups over ￿rm-speci￿c marginal
costs, p(') = 1=('). As ￿rms di￿er only in productivity, total demand and revenue
for a single variety can be rewritten as q (') = L(')
 P  1 and r(') = L('P)
 1,
respectively, and pro￿ts are given by  (') = r(')=   f. It is evident that a ￿rm with
a higher productivity charges a lower price, sells a larger quantity, and has higher revenue
and pro￿ts. The CES price index can be rewritten as follows:
P = M
1=(1 )p(e ') = M
1=(1 ) 1
e '







where M is the mass of manufacturing ￿rms (consumption variety), (') is the produc-
tivity distribution, and e ' is the average productivity across those ￿rms in the market.
2.3 Entry, exit and the technological potential
We now embed this static model into a dynamic framework in continuous time. En-
trepreneurs can enter the manufacturing industry subject to a sunk entry cost fe. The
mass of entrants is given by ME at each point in time. Upon entry, they learn about their
productivity level ', which is randomly drawn from a common and known distribution. In




k, with density g (') = k
 
'MINk ' (k+1). Here, k > 1 is the shape
parameter and 'MIN > 0 is the lower bound.6
Figure 1 illustrates the fat-tailed shape of the Pareto distribution, and it particularly
focuses on the economic meaning of the parameter 'MIN. We depict two Pareto distribu-
6This modelling strategy where ￿rms randomly draw their productivity follows Hopenhayn (1992) and
Melitz (2003). It has become the seminal approach for studying ￿rm heterogeneity in a general equilibrium
model. The Pareto distribution is widely used in this literature, see Bernard et al. (2003) or Melitz and
Ottaviano (2008), and also ￿ts empirical ￿rm size distributions fairly well, see Axtell (2001).
5tions with di￿erent lower bounds 'MIN
high and 'MIN
low . As can be seen, with 'MIN
high ￿rms draw
their idiosyncratic productivity from a ￿better￿ ex ante distribution, as the mass within
the entire distribution is shifted to the right. We shall henceforth refer to the parameter
'MIN as the country’s technological potential.
Figure 1 here
After learning about the idiosyncratic productivity draw, every ￿rm decides whether
to remain active in the market or to exit immediately. If a ￿rm remains active, it earns
constant per-period pro￿ts as described above. Since a ￿rm cannot cover the per-period
￿xed costs f when ' is too low, it turns out that all ￿rms with a productivity draw below
some cuto￿ level ' decide to exit, while all ￿rms with a draw above ' remain active. As
in Melitz (2003), every active ￿rm can then be hit by a bad shock with probability  > 0
at each point of time, which is assumed to be uncorrelated with the ￿rms’ productivity
draws. If this shock occurs, the ￿rm must shut down. In a stationary equilibrium without
time discounting, the mass of entrants which successfully enter the market equals the mass
of ￿rms which are forced to exit: pinME = M, where pin = 1   G(') is the ex ante
survival probability of entrants. The endogenous productivity distribution among active
￿rms, ('), is then the conditional ex ante distribution g (') on the domain (';1], which
in the present case is also a Pareto distribution with shape parameter k.
2.4 Equilibrium
Equilibrium can be characterized by two conditions. The free entry condition (FEC) states
that the value of entry, vE = E
P1
t=0 (1   )
t  (')












The zero cuto￿ pro￿t condition (ZCPC) pins down the revenue of the cuto￿ ￿rm,
r(') = f, which by using r(e ')=r(') = (e '=')









f (   1)
k + 1   
; (ZCPC)
with k >  + 1. Using (FEC) and (ZCPC), we obtain the following equilibrium cuto￿




AUT =    '
MIN;   

f (   1)
fe (k + 1   )
1=k
; (3)
where fe must be su￿ciently low and/or f su￿ciently high to ensure that   > 1, which is
required for consistency. Under the Pareto distribution, the average productivity among all






Furthermore, since aggregate expenditure on varieties, L, must equal aggregate revenue
of manufacturing ￿rms, R = Mr = Mr(e '), we obtain M = L=r, where r =  ( + f),
and consequently ME = M=(1   G('
AUT)). The equilibrium masses of entrants and of
surviving ￿rms can thus be expressed explicitly as:
MAUT =












Finally, using (1), (2), (3) and (4), indirect utility can be computed as follows:





lnL + 1; (5)
where 1 =  (ln()   1) +

 1 ln(=f) is a constant. Notice that welfare is increasing
in the population size L and in the cuto￿ productivity '
AUT. Notice further that an
increase in the technological potential leads to a proportional increase in the cuto￿ and
the average productivity, and hence to a welfare gain, while the masses of entrants ME
AUT
and of surviving ￿rms MAUT are independent of 'MIN.
To understand this, consider the e￿ect of an increase in the technological potential in
the short run. For a given cuto￿ productivity, this raises the survival probability and,
hence, the ￿rms’ expected pro￿ts. More entry is induced, and more ￿rms appear in the
market in the short run. This increases competition and causes exit of the least produc-
tive incumbent ￿rms, which in turn raises the cuto￿, lowers again the ex ante survival
probability, the expected pro￿ts and, hence, the value of entry. Under the assumed Pareto
distribution, these opposite e￿ects turn out to be of equal magnitude, so that an increase
in the technological potential eventually leaves the masses of entrants and surviving ￿rms
una￿ected in the long run, but increases the cuto￿ and average productivity among the
surviving ￿rms. In other words, an increase in the technological potential does not lead to
more but to better ￿rms in the long run equilibrium. These better ￿rms charge lower prices
and sell more output, which implies a welfare gain for consumers. Aggregate spending on
varieties (i.e., aggregate revenue of manufacturing ￿rms) remains constant at L, however.
72.5 Investments into basic research and the technological potential
We now consider the government which levies a lump-sum tax on households and spends
the tax revenue on basic research, i.e., on public research foundations, labs, innovation
funds, higher education, and so on. In our model, those public research investments lead
to an increase in the country’s technological potential 'MIN. Notice that this provision
of basic research does not lead to ex post gains for all ￿rms, which still face idiosyncratic
risks of business failure. The gains of this policy arise from an ex ante perspective, by
improving the premises for domestic entrepreneurs.
For simplicity we normalize the country size to one, L = 1. The tax rate is denoted by t,
and since w = 1 and L = 1, total tax revenue is given by T = t. The variable T also denotes
the total public research expenditure, since we assume a balanced budget and an e￿cient
government. The total amount of basic research is denoted by H (T), and in the case of zero
expenditure we have H (0) = 0. For positive expenditure levels, we assume that there are
positive but decreasing marginal returns, i.e., H0 = @H=@T > 0, and H00 = @H0=@T < 0,
and we impose a mild condition on the curvature of this schedule, (H0)2 <  H00, which
facilitates our analysis below. The country’s technological potential depends positively on
the level of basic research, and for concreteness we assume the following speci￿cation: 7
'
MIN = expfH (T)g; (6)
which normalizes the technological potential to unity if the country conducts no basic
research. It is then straightforward to show that public research expenditure raises the




















Finally, turning to welfare in the closed economy, we can rewrite expression (5) in the
following way by using (3), L = 1, and y = 1   T:
V = 1   T +   ln'
MIN (T) + 2; (7)
where 2 = 1 +  ln  is a constant. The government maximizes this expression with
respect to T. The condition for a welfare maximum is given by
7The exponential speci￿cation of 'MIN in (6) is analytically convenient, but our subsequent results do
not crucially hinge on this functional form.
8@V
@T
=  1 + 
'MIN0
'MIN =  1 + H
0 = 0; (8)
and from equation (8) we can disentangle the di￿erent e￿ects of higher research expenditure
on welfare. A higher T raises the technological potential of the country, and thereby the
cuto￿ and the average productivity of ￿rms in the market. This in turn lowers the price
index, increases physical consumption of the di￿erentiated varieties, and eventually leads
to a welfare gain at the margin H0. On the other hand, the required lump-sum taxes have
a negative unit welfare burden at the margin, since the consumption of the homogenous
good is reduced. Using (8), we can state the following result:
Proposition 1 i) The government invests into basic research if H0 > 1 for any 0 < T < 1,
which is the case if consumers have a su￿ciently strong preference for varieties . ii) The
higher  is, the higher is the optimal expenditure level and tax rate T 
AUT.
The proof of part i) follows directly from (8). The comparative static result ii) can be












2H00 > 0: (9)
To illustrate proposition 1, consider the example H =
p
T which satis￿es the aforemen-






, and solving H0 = 1=
then leads to T 
AUT = 2=4 > 0.
Notice that the implementation of this policy a￿ects the manufacturing sector only
at the intensive margin in the long run equilibrium: ￿rms become more productive but
consumption variety MAUT does not change. In the short run there are instantaneous
changes at the extensive margin, however, as we have discussed above. Notice also that
this policy a￿ects the resource allocation as it increases the share of the workforce that is
employed in the manufacturing sector. 8
8In the homogeneous goods sector, aggregate revenue needs to equal aggregate factor payments due to
perfect competition. Since the tax lowers the consumers’ disposable incomes, and since all income e￿ects
of demand accrue in the A-sector, this implies that (1      t)L = (1   )L, where  is the manufacturing
employment share. This implies  =  + t, i.e., higher taxes increase the manufacturing share because
aggregate physical output of the manufacturing sector increases which requires more labor there.
93 Open Economy
We now consider a scenario with two countries r = 1;2. These countries are identical in
population size (L1 = L2 = 1), but may di￿er in their technological potentials. Ultimately
we are interested in the determination of the endogenous public research investments that
imply those di￿erences, see sections 4 and 5 below. In this section, we ￿rst neglect taxes
and analyze the open economy equilibrium when the countries’ technological potentials
are exogenously given. Speci￿cally, we assume that entrants in both countries draw their
productivity from a Pareto distribution with the same shape parameter k, but country 1
has a higher technological potential than country 2, i.e., 'MIN
1 > 'MIN
2 .
In the A-sector there are no trade costs. This ensures factor price equalization provided
both sectors are active in both countries after trade. In sector C there are two types of
trade costs. First, there are per-period ￿xed costs of exporting, fx, that arise if a ￿rm
decides to serve the market in the other country. Second, there are the standard iceberg
trade costs, i.e., for one unit of output to arrive the ￿rm needs to ship  > 1 units.
The open economy equilibrium can be determined similarly as in the closed economy
case, also see Melitz (2003), Demidova (2008), and P￿ueger and Suedekum (2009) for more






The (ZCPC) changes due to the fact that ￿rms can now engage in exporting. Ex ante ex-
pected pro￿ts in country r (conditional on survival) can now be written in the following way:
r = r (e 'r) + pxrxr (e 'xr), where pxr = ('
r='
xr)
k is the probability to be an exporter
among all active ￿rms from country r, xr (e 'xr) is the corresponding expected export pro￿t
level, e 'r is the average productivity among all active domestic ￿rms, and e 'xr is the average
productivity among all exporting ￿rms from country r.
Using e 'r='





1=( 1), which holds under the Pareto distribution,









, where s = f1;2g 6= r
and where    k (f=fx)
k+1 
 1 is a measure of trade openness. Substituting the (FEC)
into the (ZCPC) then leads to a system of two equations, which can be solved for the



















    '
MIN
2 ; (10)





k < 1 measures the
relative technological potential of country 2. We assume fx  f, which is su￿cient for
100 <  < 1. A higher  then indicates a higher level of trade openness, with  ! 1 and
 ! 0 capturing the borderline cases of free trade and autarky, respectively. We need to
impose that the technological asymmetry is su￿ciently small relative to the level of trade
openness, namely  > , to ensure that '
r > 0 for r = 1;2. Provided this condition
holds, we also have '
r >    'MIN
r for r = 1;2, i.e., both countries have a higher cuto￿
productivity in the open economy than under autarky, which illustrates the selection e￿ect
of trade emphasized by Melitz (2003). Furthermore, domestic and export cuto￿s can be
linked as follows: '
xs = '
r, with    (fx=f)
1=( 1) > 1 due to fx  f. This, in turn,





there is tougher selection in the technologically leading country 1. Firms from country 1
hence have a higher cuto￿ and average productivity than ￿rms from country 2.
To complete the description of the equilibrium we need to determine the share of the
workforce that is employed in the manufacturing sector in either country. As in Demidova
(2008) and P￿ueger and Suedekum (2009) we use the aggregate trade balance condition


















It follows from (11) that 1 = 2 =  if countries are symmetrical ( = 1), or if trade costs
are prohibitive ( ! 0). In the asymmetrical case ( < 1) we need to impose parameter
restrictions such that both sectors are active in both countries after trade, 0 < r < 1 for
r = 1;2. These conditions are spelled out in the Appendix. Using 1 and 2 as given in
(11), it is then straightforward to derive the equilibrium masses of entrants ( ME
r ), surviving
￿rms (Mr), exporting ￿rms (Mxr), and consumption variety (Mtr = Mr + Mxs) for both
countries ￿ also see the Appendix. The CES price index in the open economy is given
by Pr = M
1=(1 )
tr =(e 'tr), where e 'tr is the average productivity among all (domestic and
foreign) ￿rms active in market r. Finally, welfare in country r can be written as follows:









which is su￿ciently described by the domestic cuto￿ productivity '
r that, in turn, de-
pends positively on the country’s technological potential 'MIN
r , as can be seen from (10).
Proposition 2 summarizes the main insights for the case where the two countries di￿er
exogenously in their technological potentials. The proof is also relegated to the Appendix.
11Proposition 2 Suppose country 1 has a higher technological potential than the identically
large country 2. Furthermore, assume that the parameter restrictions (A3) hold (see the
Appendix), so that 0 < r < 1 for r = 1;2. The technologically leading country 1 then has:
i) more entrants (ME
1 > ME
2 ), ii) more surviving ￿rms (M1 > M2), iii) more exporting
￿rms (Mx1 > Mx2) and a higher exporting probability ( px1 > px2), iv) greater consump-
tion diversity (Mt1 > Mt2), v) higher average productivity of domestic ￿rms ( e '1 > e '2),
vi) higher productivity of ￿rms active in the domestic market ( e 't1 > e 't2), and vii) higher
welfare (V1 > V2).
These results illustrate the bene￿ts of having a higher technological potential in an open
economy setting. Those bene￿ts play a crucial role when thinking about the government
incentives for basic research investments that will be analyzed in the next section. It is also
instructive to consider the role of trade in amplifying those bene￿ts. Speci￿cally, consider
two autarkic economies 1 and 2 that are identical, except that country 1 has a higher
technological potential. Using (3) the relative cuto￿ productivity across the two countries,




2 ) > 1 under
autarky. When the two countries trade with each other, it follows from (10) that the relative
cuto￿ becomes ('
1='
2) =   ('MIN
1 ='MIN
2 ), with   [(1   )=(   )]
(1=k) > 1 and
@=@ > 0. That is, the di￿erence in domestic cuto￿s (and, hence, in welfare) is larger
with trade than under autarky, and is increasing in the level of trade openness.
The reason is that the technological di￿erence leads to a competitive advantage for the
￿rms from the leading country: Since the market in country 1 has tougher selection, it
is more di￿cult for ￿rms from country 2 to export to the market in 1 than vice versa.
This, in turn, reduces the incentives for entry in country 2 and leads to looser selection
in that market, which even boosts the expected exporting pro￿ts for ￿rms from country
1. The freer trade is, the more important are these considerations, and the stronger is the
endogenous welfare di￿erence for a given exogenous disparity in 'MIN
r across countries.
4 Basic Research Investments without Spillovers
We now turn to the analysis of endogenous basic research investments among two identically
large countries (with L1 = L2 = 1). The tax revenue and public expenditure level in
country r is denoted by Tr. Analogous to the closed economy case, the amount of basic
research is given by H (Tr) with H (0) = 0, H0 > 0 and H00 < 0. We assume in this section
12that there are no spillovers across countries. That is, the research conducted in country
r does not a￿ect the technological potential of the other country s, or vice versa. The
technological potential in country r is consequently described by 'MIN
r = expfH (Tr)g.
4.1 Nash-Equilibrium
We ￿rst consider the scenario where both countries set their public research investments
non-cooperatively. Taking into account (12) and the lump-sum taxes, welfare in country r
can be written as follows:
Vr = 1   Tr +   ln'













^ r   

+ 3; (13)
where 3 = 1+ ln +






k is a measure of
the relative technological potential of country r, with ^ r >  to ensure '
r > 0 for r = 1;2.
The condition for a welfare optimum is given by:
@Vr
@Tr
=  1 + H
0 (Tr) +
H0 (Tr)
(expfH (Ts)   H (Tr)g)
k   
= 0: (14)
There exists a symmetric Nash-equilibrium where both countries set the same tax rate
Tr = Ts = T. In that case, (14) simpli￿es to:
@V
@T









Using (15) we can disentangle the di￿erent e￿ects of higher research investments on welfare.
First, the required lump-sum taxes imply a marginal cost equal to unity. Second, the
investments increase the own technological potential, which tends to raise the domestic
cuto￿ and average productivity as well as welfare. This is the marginal bene￿t H0 that
we have already discussed in the closed economy case. Finally, there is a new ￿trade
e￿ect￿, H0=(1   ), which depicts the marginal e￿ect of the research investments on
the relative technological potential of the two countries. As discussed above, a higher
relative technological potential is bene￿cial for country r, as it leads to a competitive
advantage for domestic ￿rms relative to their competitors from the other country s. This
mirrors the strategic incentive for governments to invest into basic research. The higher
the trade openness  is, the greater is the governments’ incentive to give domestic ￿rms
13this competitive advantage. Trade liberalization thus increases the research investments
in the Nash-equilibrium. To see this analytically, de￿ne  = H0=(1   )   1 and use the












(1   )H00 > 0: (16)
We can hence state the following result:
Proposition 3 i) The tax and public research expenditure in the open economy Nash-
equilibrium with two identical countries, T , is higher than under autarky. ii) Trade liber-
alization leads to higher taxes and public research expenditure T .
To illustrate proposition 3, consider again the example where Hr =
p







, and solving (15) which reads as H0 = (1   )=, leads to
T  = 2=(4(1   )2) in the Nash-equilibrium, which is larger than T 
AUT derived above.
4.2 Cooperative Policy
Now consider the scenario where the countries cooperatively set their policies. Given
the quasi-linear preferences with identical marginal utility of income, joint welfare can be
precisely measured by a utilitarian social welfare function. Joint welfare 
 is given by:
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
+23; (17)
where the interaction term in squared parentheses encapsulates the cross-country external-











(expfH (Tr)   H (Ts)g)
k   
= 0
for r = 1;2. Imposing T1 = T2 = T due to symmetry, the last two terms on the right
hand side of this equation just cancel out, so that the simpli￿ed ￿rst-order condition for




=  1 + H
0 = 0: (18)
14We can hence state
Proposition 4 Consider two identical open economies that cooperatively set their basic
research investments. Without cross-country spillovers the cooperative policy is equivalent
to the policy that each country would choose under autarky .
A comparison of propositions 3 and 4 directly implies that the Nash-equilibrium policy
is characterized by over-investments into basic research from a social perspective, and that
trade liberalization exacerbates this problem. The reason is that every government tries to
give domestic ￿rms a competitive advantage in trade, but the e￿ects of the own research
investments are just o￿set by the impact of the foreign investments. When coordinat-
ing the research expenditures, those negative cross-country externalities are internalized.
With policy coordination the average productivity of ￿rms is thus lower than in the Nash-
equilibrium, but this is optimal since the excessively high research investments in the
non-cooperative scenario imply too little consumption of the homogenous good.
5 Basic Research Investments with Spillovers
We now turn to the analysis where the basic research conducted in one country does a￿ect
the technological potential of the other country. We assume that the technological potential
in country r is described by 'MIN
r = expfH (Tr) +   F (Ts)g, where the amount of basic
research in the foreign country s is given by F (Ts). Analogously as before we assume that
F (0) = 0;F 0 > 0 and F 00 < 0. Notice that the strength of the spillover depends on the
level of trade openness, , which we consider to be a broad measure of the level of economic
integration between the two countries. 9
5.1 Nash-Equilibrium
Considering ￿rst the non-cooperative policy determination, the necessary condition for a
welfare maximum can now be written as
@Vr
@Tr
=  1 + H
0 (Tr) +
H0 (Tr)   2F 0 (Tr)
(expfH (Ts)   H (Tr) + F (Tr)   F (Ts)g)
k   
= 0: (19)
9See Adams (1990), Ja￿e (1989) and Branstetter (2001) for empirical evidence that knowledge spillovers
(e.g. from patent citations) exhibit a rapid spatial decay, but ￿ow more rapidly across ecomically well
integrated areas.
15There exists a symmetric Nash-equilibrium policy where both countries set the same tax

















It follows from (20) that the marginal bene￿t is composed of two terms, i) the term
H0=(1   ) that is already known from the case without spillovers (see section 4.1),
and the new ￿spillover e￿ect￿. Both terms increase in trade openness but have opposite
signs. Comparing (20) with (15), it immediately follows that the Nash-equilibrium expen-
diture T  is lower with direct cross-country spillovers than without it. The reason is that
the competitive advantage for domestic ￿rms is smaller when foreign entrepreneurs also
bene￿t from the domestic public research expenditure. 10
With higher trade openness this ￿free rider￿ problem becomes more severe, which damp-
ens the government incentive to invest. On the other hand, freer trade raises the term
H0=(1   ) which tends to increase the Nash-equilibrium expenditure. The question is
thus if trade liberalization leads to an overall increase or decrease of T  when direct cross-
country spillovers play a role. To address this question, let   H0   F 0. One would
typically expect that domestic research expenditure has a stronger impact on the domestic
than on the foreign technological potential, i.e.,  > 0. We refer to this case as the ￿weak
spillover￿ scenario. For this case it is straightforward to show that the Nash-equilibrium
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H0 + ( 2 + )F 0
(1   )(2F 00   H00)
=  
H0 (1   2) + (2   )
(1   )(1   2)H00 : (21)
This term is unambiguously positive with  > 0. Nevertheless, there may be instances
where domestic research investments have a stronger impact on the foreign than to the
home country.11 For situations like this we have  < 0 and refer to it as the ￿strong
spillover￿ case. Solving @T=@ = 0 for  leads to   = 1  
p
 =F 0 with   < 1 if
10This parallels the well known result that single ￿rms have lower incentives to invest into R&D when
there are direct spillovers to other ￿rms, see Spence (1984) as a seminal reference.
11What we have in mind here are small countries like Hong Kong with a strong in￿ow of Chinese and
other foreign students. Depending on the degree of economic integration, research investments in Hong
Kong may actually lead to stronger e￿ects in those foreign countries than in Hong Kong itself.
16 < 0. The Nash-equilibrium expenditure level T  is increasing (decreasing) in  if the
level of trade openness is below (above)  . In other words, there is a hump-shaped pattern
between  and T  when  < 0, and the downward-sloping range starts earlier the stronger
the spillover is (the lower  is). Summing up, we can state the following result:
Proposition 5 i.) For any given  the Nash-equilibrium research expenditure, T , is lower
with direct cross-country spillovers than without it. ii.) Trade liberalization increases T  if
spillovers are weak. iii.) In the case of strong spillovers, trade liberalization ￿rst leads to
an increase and then to a decrease of T .
To illustrate this result, suppose that H =
p
T and F = s
p
T, where s denotes the strength
of the spillover. With 0 < s < 1 we have a weak, and with s > 1 we have a strong spillover.
Solving (20) yields T  =
2(1 s2)
2
4(1 )2 , which achieves a global maximum at  =
p
1=s.
Hence, there only exists a maximum for T  in the admissible range 0 <  < 1 if s > 1,
while T  is monotonically increasing in  for all s < 1.
5.2 Cooperative Policy
Finally, turning to the cooperative policy determination for the case with direct cross-







H0 (Tr)   2F 0 (Tr)
expfg   
+
F 0 (Tr)   H0 (Tr)expfg
1   expfg
= 0; (22)
for r = 1;2, where the argument of the exponential function is suppressed to simplify no-
tation and is given by expfg = expfk (H (Ts)   H (Tr) + F (Tr)   F (Ts))g. Imposing




=  1 + H
0 + F
0 = 0: (23)
De￿ne  = H0 + F 0   1 and use the implicit function theorem to derive
@T opt=@ =  F 0=(F 00 + H00) > 0. We hence have
Proposition 6 Consider two identical open economies that cooperatively set their basic
research investments. With direct cross-country spillovers, trade liberalization leads to a
higher optimal research expenditure T opt.
17The reason is that investments not only improve the domestic technological potential,
but they now also generate a positive externality for the foreign entrepreneurs. The latter
e￿ect is stronger the higher the level of trade openness is. In comparison to the Nash-
equilibrium policy, the spillover thus does not dampen the incentive to invest. Exactly
the opposite it true. Due to the positive externality, the optimal research expenditure
level is actually higher with than without spillovers. To compare the cooperative with the
Nash-equilibrium policy, we can rewrite the ￿rst-order conditions (20) and (23) as follows:
@V
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=  1 + H
0 + F
0 = 0:
Those expressions di￿er only in the last term of @V=@T. The sign of this term depends
on , i.e., on whether the spillover is weak or strong. If the spillover is weak (strong), the
public research expenditure in the Nash-equilibrium, T , is higher (lower) than the optimal
expenditure level, T opt. Summing up, we have
Proposition 7 i.) The Nash-equilibrium is characterized by over-investments into basic
research if the direct cross-country spillover is weak, T  > T opt with  > 0. ii.) When the
spillover is strong, there are too little basic research investments from a social perspective
in the Nash-equilibrium, T  < T opt with  < 0.
This result represents the interplay between two cross-country externalities. Domestic
basic research hurts the foreign entrepreneurs as it gives domestic ￿rms a competitive ad-
vantage in trade. On the other hand there is a positive impact on the foreign technological
potential. Depending on which impact dominates there is either a net over-investment or
a net under-investment problem from a social perspective, and proposition 7 shows that
the latter arises when the spillover is strong.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have developed a two-country model with heterogeneous ￿rms where
governments can invest into basic research. These public research investments improve the
country’s technological potential and thereby bene￿t domestic entrepreneurs who start up
a business. They do not equally bene￿t all domestic ￿rms from an ex post perspective,
however, since ￿rms are still exposed to idiosyncratic risks of business failure. There
are two motives for this public research policy. First, the benevolent motive (present
18already in an autarky scenario) is to tighten ￿rm selection which in turn raises the average
productivity of ￿rms in the market, decreases the average price, and ultimately bene￿ts
consumers. Second, there is a strategic motive in an open economy setting, as ￿rms obtain
a competitive advantage in trade when the domestic country has a higher technological
potential. Due to this strategic motive, countries invest too much from a social perspective,
so that there are welfare gains from coordinating public research investments. This over-
investment problem only disappears, and turns to an under-investment problem, when
there are su￿ciently strong direct spillovers of research investments across countries.
We observe in the data that most OECD countries have increased public research spend-
ing over the last ten years. Our model provides a possible theoretical rationale for this
empirical observation. The recent decade was certainly characterized by falling trade barri-
ers and a deepening of globalization. The model predicts that this tendency of higher trade
freeness raises the strategic incentives for governments to invest into basic research, and it
is thus well consistent with the stylized facts. From a normative perspective, however, it is
unclear if this tendency is welfare improving. Our model predicts that global competition
induces single countries to over-invest into basic research, and trade liberalization tends to
exacerbate this problem.
However, in practice further trade liberalization probably also leads to a stronger di￿u-
sion of basic knowledge across countries. That is, cross-country knowledge spillovers may
also become more important as globalization proceeds. These spillovers have two basic
consequences: They lower the incentives for single countries to invest due to a standard
free rider problem, but they also tend to reduce the over-investment problem. From a
policy perspective, the optimal regime seems to be one where countries coordinate their
research investments in order to internalize cross-country externalities, and where they
also try to foster the cross-country di￿usion of the knowledge created in those coordinated
public research e￿orts.
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22Appendix: Open Economy Model
Equilibrium Firm Masses in the Open Economy
Aggregate earnings in the manufacturing sector must equal aggregate revenue of manu-
facturing ￿rms in each country, r = Mr rr, where  rr = rr (e 'r) + pxrrxr (e 'xr). This yields
Mr = r= rr for r = 1;2. Plugging these terms into the aggregate trade balance condition
for country 1, M1px1rx1 (e 'x1) = M2px2rx2 (e 'x2)+(1   ) (1   1), and into the analogous







































































Solving (A1) for r yields:
1 = 
(1 + b1)(1   b2)
1   b1b2
2 = 
(1   b2)(1   b1)
1   b1b2
; (A2)
and plugging in b1 and b2 then leads to the expressions given in (11). To ensure that
0 < r  1 for r = 1;2 we need to impose the following parameter restrictions:
0 <  < max 
(   )(1   )




<  < 1: (A3)
The conditions in (A3) require that the per-capita manufacturing expenditure, , is su￿-
ciently small, and they put an even stricter limit on the degree of asymmetry, , relative
to the level of trade openness, , than the previously mentioned condition  < , which
is automatically satis￿ed when (A3) holds. Using Mr = r= rr and 1, 2 then yields the
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From these expressions, the mass of ￿rms active in country r, Mtr = Mr + Mxs,
(i.e., consumption variety) can then be easily obtained.
Proof of Proposition 2
Consider the scenario in which country 1 has a higher technological potential than country
2, i.e., 'MIN
1 > 'MIN
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> 1: (A10)










with   [(1   )=(   )]
(1=k) > 1; (A11)






> 1, (vi) ~ 't1 > ~ 't2, since ~ '1 > ~ '2
and ~ 'x2 > ~ 'x1, and (vii) V1 > V2, since Vr is proportional to '
r.






25Table 1: R&D spending in selected OECD countries
2007/2008 2000
GERD PubGERD GERD PubGERD
% GDP per capita in USD % GDP per capita in USD
United States 2.8 381.3 2.4 293.3
Norway 1.6 355.5 1.6 291.8
Sweden 3.6 352.8 3.4 257.6
Finland 3.5 334.1 3.4 276.1
Australia; 2.1 305.4 1.5 245.7
Denmark 2.7 288.0 2.2 254.7
Switzerland 2.9 280.7 2.6 227.0
France 2.0 276.1 2.0 254.5
Korea 3.5 272.6 2.2 156.2
Japan 3.4 258.2 3.0 261.3
Netherlands 1.7 253.6 1.9 261.8
Belgium 1.9 241.7 2.0 212.4
United Kingdom 1.9 241.5 1.6 181.5
Germany 2.5 239.3 2.4 205.6
Luxembourg 1.6 206.7 1.7 96.1
New Zealand 1.2 176.8 1.0 157.3
Spain 1.3 170.9 0.8 110.1
Italy 1.1 164.5 1.0 133.2
Czech Republic 1.5 146.2 1.2 96.2
Portugal 1.2 121.0 0.8 117.0
Slovak Republic 0.5 52.2 0.6 25.4
Weighted average 2.5 286.9 2.1 232.5
Source: Own calculations based on OECD data. The table reports: i) gross domestic expenditure on
R&D (GERD) as a share of GDP for the years 2007/08 and 2000; ii) absolute public research expenditure
per capita in constant USD prices of 2000. These amounts are calculated as follows: From the absolute
GERD we subtract the business expenditure on research and development (BERD) excluding direct and
indirect government subsidies to private ￿rms. This leaves us with the public expenditure on research
and development (PubGERD) which we then divide by population size in the respective year. In the last
row we report the average across all countries weighted by population size. Due to missing data we use
di￿erent years in some cases:  data for 2004 and  data for 2006,  data for 1999.
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